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Abstract
In this article, I answer the questions from Witherington and Boom’s introduction 
to this special issue in the form of an imaginary interview, led by David Boom, equally 
imaginary editor of The Processual Inquirer, an obscure but interesting journal that ap-
pears in imaginary physical print only, and which, as a consequence, has so far left no 
traces on the Internet…. © 2019 The Author(s)
Published by S. Karger AG, Basel
Dynamics of Development and Causality
David Boom (D.B.): What does it mean for you to study the dynamics of develop-
ment? And how is causality conceptualized in your dynamics orientation on under-
standing of process in development?
Paul van Geert (P.G.): Your question refers to four basic notions, dynamics, de-
velopment, causality and process, which are very hard to define without running into 
circles or tautologies. Their meaning is basically a question of how they are used, in 
this particular case by the community of developmental researchers, which is in itself 
a very complex issue. In such cases, to open the discussion I always find it a good heu-
ristic strategy – and no more than that – to go back to the origins of the concepts, their 
etymology, to see if it can shed some new light on our understanding of what those 
concepts mean. 
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Dynamics and Development 
Let us for the time being confine ourselves to dynamics and development. Dy-
namic comes from the Greek dynamikos “powerful,” from dynamis “power, might, 
strength.” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz introduced the term in a philosophical essay in 
1695, where he says that every “bodily thing” has a basic property, namely its force, 
which is its ability to do something, to act upon other things, or to withstand, to a 
certain degree, to be changed by other things. In that sense, dynamics implies change 
as a consequence of the forces or powers inherent in things that change (later in his-
tory, the “thing” aspect would disappear entirely). Leibniz also invented differential 
calculus (and Newton invented it almost simultaneously, independent of him), which 
is the indispensable mathematical tool for dealing with change, which is a fundamen-
tal and basic feature of all physical, biological or psychological phenomena. For what 
it’s worth, it is interesting to observe that in developmental psychology, which is the 
quintessential science of human psychological change, differential equations are vir-
tually inexistent. For me, this general notion of dynamics is inextricably connected 
with the theory of dynamic systems and complex dynamic systems that should form 
the backbone of any science of change in general and developmental psychology in 
particular.
Dynamic Systems
D.B.: I guess that this means that you want to explain what dynamic systems and 
complex dynamic systems mean before you go on with the next part of my question? 
P.G.: Let me begin with a simple definition of dynamic systems. 
A dynamic system is a system whose current state generates its successive state 
by a rule or principle of change (the so-called evolution rule) and thus produces a 
trajectory in a state space. System can be defined as any whole of connected elements, 
that is, the things that form a “whole” through their connections, connections that are 
supposed to have a certain durability. The state of the system can be any “slice” an 
observer wishes to make through the ongoing process; it is the current value or values 
of the property or properties that are used to characterize the system. And the state 
space is nothing more than the space formed by such properties. The evolution rule 
or principle of change is anything that generates the next state out of the current one. 
For each dimension in the state space (that is to say, for each variable or component) 
you have to specify a rule of change, and these rules of change are coupled. What hap-
pens in one dimension or variable has an effect on what happens in another. It is the 
coupling between these dimensions or variables that explains why the whole thing is 
a system (Table 1).
An important form of change is zero change, i.e. stability, where the dynamics 
actively re-creates its preceding state into the current state. Stability and endurance 
are not the basic or default states of the world, as they would be in a typical substance-
oriented ontology. In fact, they are the highly specific products of ongoing interacting 
processes. 
Sometimes the evolution rule can be simplified to a mathematical expression, for 
instance in the form of a differential or difference equation (e.g. Van Geert, 1991, 
1994), but sometimes the dynamics are simply too complex to be represented by such 
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a mathematical function (which requires a conceptual model of why a particular prop-
erty is changing over time). In that case, we have the possibility to represent it in the 
form of possible trajectories of a ball rolling over a landscape of hills and valleys, in 
principle moving away from the hills and resting at the bottom of valleys (epigenetic 
landscapes). This landscape represents the change in a mathematical function describ-
ing a potential field, and by doing so, it can describe typical properties of the dynamics, 
for instance discontinuities and hysteresis (for an early application to human develop-
ment, see Van der Maas & Molenaar, 1992, and Newell, Liu & Mayer-Kress, 2003).
This elementary scheme of a coupled system, where one state generates the next, 
forms the starting point for interesting conceptual extensions, such as feedback, time 
delays, goal states, long-term histories, stochastic influences, interacting systems, an-
ticipation and so forth.
But every specification of a particular dynamic system is at the same time the 
specification of a particular interactor with that system, that is, an observer/describer/
intervenor, from whose interactions the specification of the system is generated. Po-
tentially, every “real system” has an intractable complexity (a ”real system” is basi-
cally a system described by all the interactions that it can possibly entertain, on all 
possible levels of its physical and temporal organization). For that reason, our under-
standing of the dynamics of the system usually occurs through the selection of a cou-
ple of properties generated by our interactions with that system in the form of obser-
vations, measurements or joint activities. By doing so, we can take a few properties 
out of the system, but we can never take the system out of the properties. That is to 
Table 1. A dynamic system
– Is a system whose current state generates its successive state by a rule or principle of change 
and thus produces a trajectory in a state space (Weisstein, 2018)
⚪ System: any whole of connected elements (forming a “whole” through their connec-
tions)
⚪ State: current value(s) of the property(s) that one uses to describe the system
⚪ Rule/principle of change: anything that generates the next state out of the current one; 
the system’s “evolution rule,” which is the “mechanism” of its change
Examples of formalizations
– The next state is a function of the current state 
xt + 1 = f(xt) or  
– Successive application of this principle defines a flow, sequence or process
xt + 1 = f(xt) → xt + 2 = f (xt + 1) → xt + 3 = f(xt + 2) → … 
– A state space consisting of more than one dimension requires coupling between the dimen-
sions in the form of coupled functions, describing interactions between 2 or more variables 
or components of the system
[xt + 1 = f(xt, yt); yt + 1 = f ’(yt, xt)] → [xt + 2 = f(xt + 1, yt + 1); yt + 2 = f ’(yt + 1, xt + 1)] → etc.
Note: for simplicity, I use the difference equation, based on a step of duration 1, which could 
in fact be as long or short as one wishes. The differential format could be something like 




 and it is supposed to represent a continuous flow.
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say, our choice of the descriptive state space must be so that changes over these di-
mensions conserve or represent characteristic properties of the system as a whole. Ex-
amples of such characteristic properties are temporal patterns of variability, stability, 
gradual change and discontinuities, irreversibility and reversibility, progress and re-
gress, recurrence and so forth. All this occurs on a variety of coupled coexisting tim-
escales characteristic of the system in question. For instance, we see processes on the 
timescale of real activities such as in children’s playing, making a math assignment in 
school or having a discussion with a friend, on the timescale of the recurrence of such 
activities over weeks or months, and on the timescale of long-term changes – vari-
ances and invariances – over years or decades that we typically associate with devel-
opment as a life span process. 
Every variable (dimension of the state space, component, …) we use to describe 
a system corresponds with some sort of order, structure and recurrence in the pro-
cesses that characterize the system (e.g., a child’s vocabulary, an adolescent’s self-es-
teem-related acts or the spoon-feeding patterns in a parent-infant dyad). Without 
such order and recurrence, our scientific interactions with and understanding of the 
system would be totally ephemeral. If we zoom in on a particular variable, we will see 
that it “explodes” in a multitude of underlying variables. But the recurrent way such 
variables are connected in typical processes (e.g., using and speaking a particular 
word, cognitive levels in problem solving) are sufficient for justifying our treatment 
of them as wholes or structures with a certain autonomy, endurance and recurrence 
that guarantees their usability as units or foci of analysis. 
Instead of conceptualizing these variables as dimensions of a space (the typical 
geometric approach of classical dynamic systems), they can just as well be conceptu-
alized as nodes in a network, with every node characterized by its changing properties 
over time, the change of which is caused by its inherent dynamics and by its connec-
tions or coupling with other nodes. In addition, the state space may be composed by 
nominal or ordinal variables (e.g., various forms of emotional reactions during a so-
cial interaction). Any pair of such variables forms a grid, like a chessboard, and the 
dynamics of the system may be described in the form of a series of moves across the 
grid. The application of such grids, so-called state space grids, is becoming an increas-
ingly popular technique for describing the dynamics of various sorts of developmen-
tal changes (e.g., Hollenstein, 2013).
Development: A View from Its Etymology
D.B.: How does this combine with the notion of development?
P.G.: Development literally means to unwrap (www.etymonline.com/word/de-
velop). The Dutch and German words for development, ontwikkeling and Entwick-
lung, respectively, literally translate as un-wrapping. That is to say, in its original 
meaning, development refers to something that is given from the origin onwards, and 
that waits for its being unwrapped such that it can become manifest. Under this in-
terpretation, development bears a highly nativist sort of connotation, but the etymol-
ogy is ambiguous, in this regard. First, the wrapping might refer to the object itself, 
in which case the word means that something is being unfolded, like a leaf folded up 
in a bud that unfolds itself in spring. Second, the thing present before it unwraps, i.e. 
develops, could be interpreted as a potential, potential meaning power, might, force, 
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capability, possibility and so forth. And this very likely interpretation brings us back 
to our first basic concept, namely dynamics, which was defined as a force or power 
that entails a capability or possibility, that is, a potential. When I combine these anal-
yses of the meaning of dynamics and of development, it seems to me that a meta-
theory such as dynamic systems or complex dynamic systems theory, offers a perfect 
technical, consistent and versatile framework for conceptualizing and studying the 
dynamics of development, as defined in its semantic roots. 
Causality and Complex Dynamic Systems
D.B.: What about causality? How does your dynamics orientation differ from tra-
ditional, “cause-effect” or “intervening variable” approaches to the study of mecha-
nisms and processes in psychology? How is causality conceptualized in your dynamics 
orientation?
The Standard Scheme
P.G.: The Latin causa means “a cause; a reason; interest; judicial process, law-
suit, …” In Germanic languages, such as Dutch and German, the word for cause is 
oorzaak and Ursache, respectively, which means “the original or basic ground of 
something.” In Aristotelian philosophy, which has been very influential in the devel-
opment of Western science, the word “cause” means “explanation”: a cause is a reason 
that one invokes if one answers a why-question. Aristotle made the distinction be-
tween material, formal, efficient and final causes. The modern, standard conception 
of causality has reduced this scheme to a very narrow definition of efficient causes 
only, but this is unfortunate as the notions of cause and explanation (answering a 
why-question) are so closely related to one another. 
Causality is a subtle and complex notion, but the way we habitually talk about 
causes in the developmental sciences – the praxis of causal statements – enacts a 
highly limited and specific view on what causality is or represents. In fact, it is a 
strongly pragmatically inspired use of cause and causality, inspired by our wish to do 
something to change the course of things. 
In the standard praxis, we start with some idea of the way things occur “on aver-
age” or “normally,” the-world-as-usual, which we basically see as a static thing (there 
is no change). Then we intervene, which literally means that we “come in between,” 
that we do something to interrupt the normal course by an external event. We observe 
that, contingent on this doing, the normal course is deflected, that is, changes its cus-
tomary route in the direction we expected. Without this intervening, things would 
have stayed the same (the argument of counterfactuality). In this standard view, 
we are combining the notion of manipulability – that we can do things to act on the 
world – with an antecedent (cause)-consequent (effect) scheme, where one thing is 
in rest, until it is “hit” in some way by another thing, after which the thing in rest 
moves to another place, to stay there in a resting position until it is hit yet again (it’s 
basically a sort of billiard ball scheme). In addition, we assume that the cause can be 
shielded off from other events, so that it can be treated as an independent entity.
Human Development 2019;63:153–179158 van Geert
DOI: 10.1159/000503825
D.B.: But doesn’t this scheme more or less exhaust the possible ways of scientifically 
conceptualizing causality? Alternatives such as vital forces or teleological causality have 
been shown to be incompatible with what we know about forces and causes in nature. 
P.G.: The first possibility is that this elementary antecedent-consequent two-
event scheme is indeed the basic scheme of causality, with all other expressions of 
causality reducible to ever more complicated combinations of this basic building 
block (for critical reviews, see Anjum & Mumford, 2018, in biology, and Withering-
ton & Heying, 2015, in developmental psychology). This is what we find in the so-
called manipulability or intervention-based theories of causality. A typical technical 
operationalization of this approach, underscoring causal analysis by means of struc-
tural equation modeling, is the theory of directed acyclical graphs by Judea Pearl (e.g., 
Morgan & Winship, 2012; Pearl & McKenzie, 2018) or the philosophical theory of 
James Woodward (2005). It is closely related to the so-called counterfactual theories 
of causality (something is the cause of an effect if that effect wouldn’t have happened 
if the cause didn’t happen). We find it back in the standard effectiveness criterion of 
intervention research.
Dynamic Systems and Process Causality 
D.B.: I guess this first option covers the traditional “cause-effect” or “intervening 
variable” approaches. What is your second option, and how does it relate to dynamic 
systems?
P.G.: The second option is that this two-event antecedent-consequent causal 
scheme is a special case subsumed under a more general encompassing scheme of 
interactions of forces that complies with what we know about how nature works. 
We can actually begin with dynamic systems as defined earlier, namely as “a sys-
tem whose current state generates its successive state by a rule or principle of change.” 
That is to say, the current state is the cause of the next state, which is the cause of the 
state next to it and so forth, all along the process that this sequence of states is repre-
senting (states can be discrete steps, or points on a continuum). This scheme defines 
what is called process causality (for introductions, see Rescher, 1996, 2000, Bickhard, 
2011, and Seibt, 2018; for developmental psychology in particular, see Overton, 2015, 
and Witherington, Overton, Lickliter, Marshall & Narvaez, 2018). The so-called evo-
lution rule that defines a particular dynamic system is the expression of the process 
causality that governs the system (on the notion of process causality, see Salmon, 
1994, and Dowe, 2007, 2009). 
Classical “intervention” causality can be viewed as a specific case of process cau-
sality. Suppose you have a process – a teacher teaching and a student learning, a child 
developing – that unfolds as a consequence of its inherent process dynamics, i.e. its 
inherent process causality, which is a function of the way all components contribut-
ing to the process are coupled or are interacting (e.g., Vallacher, van Geert, & Nowak, 
2015). An intervention can in principle start at any arbitrary moment in this process, 
but it will usually begin at the point where it is triggered by properties of the ongoing 
process itself (parents will start spoon feeding at the moment they think their baby is 
ready for it, which means that the baby triggers the intervention). At this point, these 
processes will begin to interact over time (the process at issue and the process of in-
tervention).
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Properties of the intervention process are assimilated into the system proper-
ties at that particular moment in time (the intervention is assimilated in the state 
space defining the system). The next state of the system is a consequence of the 
preceding state, which includes the assimilated intervention event (which is not yet 
the full intervention but just its starting point, whatever that may be). If the inter-
vention goes on, the next state in the process will determine how the intervention 
is further assimilated into the system, how it intertwines with the system’s own 
dynamics (which might change over the course of time). This interaction will co-
determine the next state in the interacting system, and so on until this pattern of 
coordinations between the processes stops, for instance when this pattern becomes 
recurrent, i.e. stable, for instance according to normative standards of the partici-
pants. 
D.B.: Is process causality the only contribution of dynamic systems to our concep-
tualization of causality in general and in development in particular?
Causality and Complex Dynamic Systems
P.G.: No, it is not. But to understand the full contribution of dynamic systems to 
our understanding of causality, you need the theory of complex dynamic systems. 
Complexity is often confused with complicatedness. The origin of the word complex 
is “being woven together,” “being intertwined,” whereas complicated stems from “be-
ing folded together.” Something that is folded must be understood by unfolding it so 
that its constituent folds become manifest. But something that is woven or inter-
twined must be understood by observing how it is intertwined. If you take it apart, 
you lose its essential property of an intertwined whole. To simplify things, you could 
say that you can understand complicated things by isolating their components, leav-
ing open, more or less, the possible ways in which such components might interact. 
And you can understand complex things by focusing on the way their components 
interact, leaving open which components exactly are involved in the interaction (as 
an exact determination of the latter might be an almost intractable problem if the sys-
tem is a complex dynamic system). 
But what is more important, I think, is that complex systems – interacting inter-
twined wholes – have a number of very important properties that are directly relevant 
to the issues of causality as well as development. The first property is that any lasting 
form of interaction between many components is an expression of self-organization. 
For simplicity, you could think of putting any number of components together – per-
sons, emotions, skills, cells, material objects, etc. – and see what happens when they 
interact, if they interact at all. Such interactions may very rapidly disappear, leaving 
the collection of components as a disordered set of autonomous things, or the inter-
actions may become self-sustaining, in which case they self-organize into self-sustain-
ing patterns of interactions of various complexity, ultimately defining the collection 
of components as a single interacting whole. Self-organization implies the spontane-
ous emergence of structure. Structure, in this particular case, implies a specific, self-
sustaining pattern of interactions. Self-organization is a genuine form of causality. 
But in order to understand how self-organization works in development, one needs 
a clear idea of the developing system’s “evolution rules,” i.e. the principles underlying 
its developmental change. I hope I can say more about that later.
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The temporal process of self-organization, based on the intrinsic dynamics of the 
system in interaction with other systems or contexts, may take a variety of forms. 
There may be a pattern of intrinsic fluctuations around what is basically a gradual 
change towards (relative) stability, for instance when a child gradually improves a 
particular skill. The gradual change may take the form of accelerations or decelera-
tions, and eventually of temporary regressions. But the change may also be nongrad-
ual, that is, it may take the form of a discontinuity, a sudden change, as when one 
particular pattern of problem solving suddenly passes into another pattern, a process 
that has been studied in the context of bifurcation or catastrophe theory (e.g., van der 
Maas & Molenaar, 1992). Or a gradual change may lead to a state where the system 
becomes critically unstable, which means that any external perturbation of any pos-
sible magnitude leads to a sudden change, the magnitude of which is basically unpre-
dictable. For instance, at a critical state of the system, a particular experience or chal-
lenge that might be totally insignificant in the great majority of cases, could have a 
cascading pattern of serious consequences leading to very rapid irreversible change 
(on self-organized criticality as a possible form of developmental change, see van 
Geert, 2008). The answer to the question of what causes these various patterns, for 
instance what causes a discontinuous shift to occur, is that these patterns are caused 
by the intrinsic dynamics of the system, and this intrinsic dynamics consists of the 
many interactions and couplings between the system’s components. You can further 
specify your answer by specifying certain properties of the intrinsic dynamics, such 
as whether the coupling is rigid or weak. But if you ask for a cause in terms of a typi-
cal singular antecedent event, the answer will be that if any singular antecedent event 
exists that indeed triggers a rapid change of considerable magnitude (when a system 
is in a state of self-organized criticality, for instance), that antecedent event itself can 
be totally trivial.
D.B.: But what sort of conception of causality lies behind all this?
P.G.: As to the conception of causality implied by complex dynamic systems 
theory, I think that we should replace the term of causality by an even more basic 
term, which is that of interaction or coupling (for a discussion of the interactive view, 
see Bickhard, this volume). We have seen that in a complex system, many compo-
nents or subsystems are coupled with or interacting with (some to many) other ones. 
It is this process of interaction that leads to self-organization, which as we have seen, 
is a particular form of causality, it is a causal process.
Emergence and Causality
But thanks to the interactions between the components of a complex system, yet 
another typical feature of complex dynamic systems arises that we need in order to un-
derstand causality, which is emergence. Emergence means that as a consequence of the 
interactions between components, the interacting whole acquires or creates new prop-
erties, i.e. properties that cannot be reduced to properties of the components or to 
simple additions of those components’ properties. This creation of new properties that 
transcend the properties of the interacting components is a genuine form of causality 
(there is an immense literature on emergent properties in physics, for instance, show-
ing that it is a very fundamental property of matter; for developmental psychology, a 
particularly relevant article is Witherington, 2011;  for a good general introduction, see 
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Clayton & Davies, 2006). It implies a form of bottom-up causality, for instance when 
the ongoing coordinations between perceptions, actions, memories in an environment 
with particular properties self-organize into emergent patterns such as skills or abilities. 
It is important to note that an emergent property does not exist separately from the in-
teractions upon which it comes about. Abstract or operational thinking, for instance, is 
for all we know an emergent property of particular coordinations and organizations of 
embodied and contextually embedded sensorimotor processes. No abstract thinking 
exists that can take place in a form that is totally devoid of sensorimotor processes. The 
latter are present in overt form as when vicarious objects such as spoken or written 
symbols are used, or partly “covert” in the form of internal imagery in combination 
with inner speech. That is, abstract thinking is an emergent enacted property of spe-
cific coordinations and couplings between embodied, intentional activities (for a dis-
cussion of the enactment position, see Di Paolo in this issue). 
Properties such as skills or abilities, like abstract or operational thinking, typi-
cally emerge on the timescale of development, in the sense that it takes a lot of prac-
tice, learning, self-organizing practices and so forth before they actually get estab-
lished as more or less stable dispositions of a particular individual. But this does not 
mean that they are internally represented in the form of frozen, separate causal struc-
tures that are taken out of their boxes when needed. It is a consequence of being a 
complex system that what happens during this long-term process of emergence takes 
the form of changes on all the levels of the bodily and contextual organization from 
which a particular process, such as the performance of a skill, actually emerges. These 
long-term changes are such that the concrete performance of a particular skill emerg-
es on the timescale of a real-time activity, by a process that has been called soft assem-
bly (Thelen & Smith, 1994) (although I am not all too happy with the somewhat 
mechanistic connotation of the word “assembly”). 
A very important causal property of emergent organization is that causality is 
not only running bottom-up, but is also going top-down, that is, emergent properties 
exert downward causation (for an excellent discussion, see Witherington, 2011, and 
the commentaries by Ellis & Bloch, 2011, and Lewis, 2011). Emergent properties are 
affecting, constraining or “affording” the interactions between the components on 
the basis of which they have emerged (Ellis, 2012). A particular skill, such as reading 
or making clay pots on a potter’s wheel, is an example of an emergent pattern, that is, 
a pattern emerging from interactions between all sorts of embodied and embedded 
perceptual, motor and memory processes in specific material and social contexts that 
provide the affordances for such processes and are continuously transformed by 
those processes. The same reasoning applies to any long-term higher-order form of 
psychological process organization, such as self-esteem, intelligence, personality and 
so forth (but all these concepts must be given a strictly processual interpretation to 
make sense in a dynamic systems framework; for an example focusing on self-esteem, 
see de Ruiter, Van Geert & Kunnen, 2017; on intelligence, see Richardson, 2017).
In summary, I believe that in complex systems such as a developing human per-
son, the fundamental notion of causality should be that of interaction, that is of pro-
cesses of reciprocal coupling or coordination between a great many components or 
subsystems. And this interaction comes with “collateral” causal properties such as 
self-organization, emergence and upward and downward causation. The standard 
manipulability or intervention format of causality is in fact only one very specific ex-
ample of the principle of interaction. 
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The question is of course why the standard praxis of psychological and develop-
mental research factually treats the two-event, antecedent-consequent scheme as the 
only game in town. The answer, I think, lies in our dominant perspective on nature, 
which is highly pragmatic. We are primarily focusing on what we can do to change 
the world such that it complies a little better with our desires and intentions. We are 
driven by the belief that for every desirable consequent, there must be an antecedent 
in the form of something that we can manipulate. And we tend to forget that every 
manipulation is in itself a prolonged process, the course of which greatly depends on 
how it interacts with and is determined by the prolonged process the course of which 
it wishes to change. 
Causality and Understanding the Process of Development
D.B.: Can you say something about the implications of this conceptualization of 
causality for our understanding of process in development?
P.G.: I can try to explain this by means of the example of educational or clinical 
interventions. The standard praxis goes more or less like this. We start with an idea 
of a given stasis, for instance teachers’ habitual teaching practices, and this normal 
course of events is evaluated against our standards as being suboptimal (e.g., the stu-
dents’ scores on scientific reasoning tests are below a norm). This is the pre-interven-
tion state of events, which is conceived of as a static property of a certain category of 
persons, teachers for instance. Our aim is to know whether a particular thing or en-
tity, namely the intervention, in general works for a particular category or kind of 
persons, such as the category “teachers” or the category “5-year-olds with ADHD.” 
All these distinctions are based on a primarily entity- or substance-oriented ontology. 
We then enter into the intervention stage, that is we “do the intervention,” which we 
tend to see as a well-delineated antecedent event (a precedent to the effect we wish to 
accomplish). What really happens of course is that each trainer enters into a long-
term pattern of interactions with individual teachers, taking the form of idiosyncrat-
ic processes that unfold as a result of a whole range of idiosyncratic (case-specific) 
reciprocal couplings between perceptions and actions, couplings between trainer and 
trainee, between social activities and material objects and contexts, between trainer-
trainee interactions and interactions with colleagues, students, and so forth. But in 
the standard praxis, each of these individual processes is treated as an error-laden 
expression of an underlying entity, which is the intervention. In addition, we use par-
ticular statistical tools to treat the idiosyncratic individual courses of events as the 
error-laden expressions of an underlying common effect. This effect is viewed as the 
result of the causal power intrinsic to this general entity, which is the intervention. All 
this directly follows from the standard praxis of defining the effect of the intervention 
as the average (± a standard deviation) of the individual effects observed in the form 
of some effect measurement. That is to say, the “real” things are, first, the intervention 
as a general object or entity, and the second the effect as a general causal property of 
that intervention entity. However, what in my view counts as the real thing, namely 
the processes of long-term individual interactions in each specific teacher or case, is 
treated as the shadows on the wall, that is, the observable but partly illusory reflections 
of an underlying, latent reality that must be extracted by averaging or aggregating 
over these intrinsically misleading, arbitrarily varying individual cases.
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Instead of reducing an educational or clinical intervention to a pretest-treatment-
posttest scheme over error-laden ensembles of individual cases, we should realize that 
such interventions are prolonged processes that must be studied on the level of indi-
vidual cases, which is the only way of getting into the nature, particularities, and fi-
nally also generalities of the dynamics (Byrne, 2009; Harvey, 2009). The processes that 
such interventions consist of take place on various timescales, and two are of primary 
importance. The first is the timescale of the real-time interactions between, for in-
stance, a teacher and a coach, or a teacher and children in the class, or between parents 
and children or between a child and a particular object such as a toy. The second is the 
long-term timescale of change, including variability and fluctuations in the activities 
and properties of interest, not only during the intervention itself but also a long time 
after the intervention has taken place. After collecting a sufficient number of such id-
iosyncratic cases, they can be compared, for instance in terms of the nature of the tra-
jectories and whether or not these trajectories followed the intended course. For in-
stance, in our study on the dynamics of feeding during the introduction to solid food, 
which implies a typical developmental parental “intervention,” we found four differ-
ent clusters of change patterns (van Dijk, Hunnius & van Geert, 2012). By making 
these comparisons against the backdrop of the general explanatory theory of complex 
dynamic systems, we might hope to arrive at a better understanding of the different 
ways particular types of interactions lead to intended and nonintended effects. 
What Kinds of Change Constitute Developmental Change?
D.B.: With respect to your dynamics orientation, what does it mean for a phenom-
enon to develop? What kinds of change over time constitute developmental change? 
What changes with, or emerges from, development? 
P.G.: There are various possibilities, again. The first possibility is based on mak-
ing a distinction between various timescales, for instance the timescale of events in 
the form of real-time activities, and events on the timescale of the life span, for in-
stance covering years or decades. Development can then be defined as any process 
where you see differences in aggregate properties on the long-term timescale. For 
instance, properties aggregated over a whole range of activities in adulthood that are 
different from properties of a whole range of activities in children are then seen as 
instances of development. For instance, they might be activities of logical problem 
solving, or activities triggered by a particular test. This is probably a rather trivial 
definition of development, but from a dynamic systems point of view it already has 
some interesting properties. First, the consistent differences in long-term aggregated 
properties, such as patterns of problem solving, must be the result of events taking 
place on the short-term timescale of the activities themselves. That is an example of 
bottom-up causality. But the long-term differences, that is, the properties that emerge 
on the long-term time span, have a causal, that is constraining and affording, effect 
on the short-term dynamics of the corresponding activities, e.g. the concrete solving 
of a problem by a person or group. This is an example of top-down effects or down-
ward causation.
The second possibility is to start with the meaning of development implicit in its 
etymology, namely the notion of unfolding or unwrapping. It is closely related to the 
notion of potential and the distinction between potential and actual properties (yet 
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another Aristotelian contribution to the way we see the world). In this case, one has 
some sort of implicit idea of what it is that unfolds, or that is being unwrapped, or one 
has an implicit idea of the nature of the potential. Implicitly, the chosen timescale is 
that of long-term, life span change. This view amounts to a more or less retrospective 
perspective on development (looking back, given a particular outcome), and it is a 
perspective that we see in various classical accounts of development, such as Piaget’s 
for instance (Van Geert, 1986a & b, 1987). The properties of the starting point of de-
velopment, e.g. in the baby, are defined in function of, or contrastive with, the prop-
erties of what is conceived of as the end point, e.g. abstract or operational thinking in 
adulthood. This provides a particular framework under which the dynamics of devel-
opment can be understood. It is a form of teleological understanding (the fourth of 
Aristotle’s categories of explanation). 
The third possibility is to equate the meaning of development to the processes 
of self-organization and emergence that take place in individual organisms on the 
timescales that are relevant for their existence. In human beings, those timescales 
range from very fast bodily, neural and physiological processes, via the timescale of 
human activities to the timescale of life span change and finally to the timescale of 
historical changes (as far as such historical changes are manifestly interacting with 
processes taking place within the confinement of the human life span). The latter is 
certainly the case if technological and cultural changes affect human activities and 
human life span changes, for instance in modern industrial cultures, where major 
technological and cultural changes take place over time courses that are of the same 
scale as the time course of developmental changes in individual persons. If develop-
ment is likened to emergence, the concept would then by definition apply to all tim-
escales at which emergence occurs. That is, there will be microdevelopment if a pro-
cess of emergence takes place on the timescale of minutes or hours for instance, as 
well as macrodevelopment on the timescale of human life spans and intergenera-
tional processes. 
An important advantage of this emergence-based conceptualization of develop-
ment is that it incorporates novelty and creativity into the framework of develop-
ment. This is important for our understanding of what I might call reproductive 
novelty on the one hand, and creative novelty on the other (I admit that these distinc-
tions are quite fuzzy). An example of reproductive novelty is language development 
in children: the language they “acquire” is in all likelihood something that emerges 
out of a myriad of interactions on the sensory, motor, memory, object and context 
levels, including the level of their own language use in the context of the language 
use of more advanced and mature speakers (other children, parents, etc.; MacWhin-
ney & Grady, 2015). But the language that emerges is very (but not entirely) similar 
to the language that has emerged in other children, or in their parents for instance, 
which is of course vital for linguistic communication to be possible. This process of 
reproductive emergence is often studied from non-emergent perspectives, postulat-
ing processes of transmission or innate structures. Creative novelty applies to all id-
iosyncratic, individual processes of emergence, leading to new and unexpected pat-
terns of skills or abilities. An idiosyncratic pattern of interaction of a particular au-
tistic child for instance could be an example of that type of emergence, although it 
would probably not count as creative in the more classical sense of the word, as it 
does not represent an innovation useful for others (e.g., Kupers, Lehmann-Wermser, 
McPherson, & van Geert, 2019). In addition to that, we see patterns of creative nov-
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elty that often arise as a consequence of interaction between many individuals, in the 
form of technological or scientific advances, or new cultural and social patterns, or 
works of art.
Timescales and Developmental Dynamics
D.B.: Do you consider it necessary to distinguish between dynamics at the level of 
real-time change (the generation of specific organismic actions in adaptation to real-
time contexts) and dynamics at higher “emergent” levels of organization (the emergence 
of new organismic skills and organizations of ability during an organism’s life span)? 
Or are developmental dynamics nothing more than real-time dynamics added up over 
time? 
P.G.: My tentative answer is: yes, it is probably necessary to make that distinc-
tion. The nature of long-term developmental dynamics, and the underlying “rules” 
of change are different from the nature of the short-term dynamics of organismic 
activity. Let us take language as an example. A particular speech act of a child, for in-
stance while talking to herself during play, or engaging in some discussion with the 
parent, is driven by a dynamics of very short-term perception-action loops, memory, 
intentions, desires or goals embedded and interacting with concrete material and so-
cial contexts. We see such utterances unfold over short-term time scales, in the con-
text of specific material and social activities. Meanwhile, there is a long-term process 
of linguistic change: the structure of the child’s utterances is definitely changing and 
evolving. These changes can be described by some explicitly formulated grammar 
that the researcher uses as a formal interpretive framework, provided by linguistics. 
One can say that under a linguistic interpretive framework, the long-term process 
amounts to the emergence of grammar, of mature linguistic competence, in the child. 
The difficult question is of course what this “grammar” means in terms of an under-
lying causal organization in the child. Anyway, it is highly unlikely that the dynamics 
underlying this long-term change, this process of emergence, are like very slowed-
down versions of the dynamics typical of the short-term speech acts, governed by 
perception, action, goals and concrete contexts. Maybe such long-term processes in-
voke neural organizations and reorganizations the dynamics of which are of an en-
tirely different kind than the dynamics of organismic action. But although the nature 
of the dynamics might be very different, neither dynamic pattern can exist without 
its direct coupling to the other. 
On the other hand, there is something like scale invariance, which means that 
properties looked at from the perspective of short durations are similar to properties 
looked at from long durations (for examples from cognitive performance, see Kello 
et al., 2010; Dixon et al., 2012; from self-esteem, de Ruiter, den Hartigh, Cox, van 
Geert, & Kunnen, 2015). To the extent that scale invariance applies to developmental 
processes – for instance when microdynamic processes reflect macrodynamic 
ones – there is no apparent distinction between short- and long-term dynamics, but 
it nevertheless remains possible that the scale invariant properties are caused by dif-
ferent underlying dynamics.
The problem with all this is that, at present, we know very little about how emer-
gent properties, such as organization of activity in terms of particular skills or abili-
ties, are related to their physical and biological conditions of origination. 
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So far, psychology, and by implication developmental psychology, has primarily 
chosen for a substance-oriented approach, which favors a certain parallelism. That is, 
it is more or less automatically assumed that for every emergent structural property, 
there is a corresponding specific brain structure that causes it (or represents or en-
codes it, to use different terminology). In the context of this approach, such parallel-
ism appears totally self-evident, but the assumption is in fact highly dubitable. For 
instance, water – which is basically an awful lot of water molecules interacting – has 
various properties: cohesion, adhesion, high solvent power, high-temperature con-
stancy, less density in solid than in liquid form, phases and phase transitions, high 
boiling point and neutral pH. All these different properties emerge out of the interac-
tions between water molecules caused by one underlying structural property, namely 
the molecule’s hydrogen bonding property (the negative side of one molecule is at-
tracted to the positive side of those around it; https://sciencing.com/how-is-a-water-
molecule-like-a-magnet-13712174.html). 
My general point is that one cannot rely on a substance-oriented principle of 
property-structure parallelism to prove the difference between short- and long-term 
dynamics (e.g., real-time activity versus development). But if you look at the nature 
of the processes taking place on these different timescales, I believe there is reason to 
(cautiously) assume that the dynamics are indeed different, and that each one creates 
the conditions for the other (see for instance Steenbeek & van Geert, 2008).
Process and Structure
D.B.: I see that this discussion brings us to the issue of structure, and how the no-
tion of structure relates to dynamics and processes. Does your dynamics orientation 
relate to an understanding of development framed in terms of psychological structures? 
A Dynamic Definition of Structure
P.G.: My career as a researcher in developmental psychology started with lan-
guage development, and I wrote my dissertation on the language development of my 
own son in the early 1970s, when the field was dominated by Chomskyan views on 
linguistic structures, generative grammars, language acquisition devices and so on. I 
tried to describe his language use in the context of perception and cognition. But I 
never doubted that the language spoken by my son, over the course of the many ac-
tivities in which language utterances were a fundamental constituent, was a highly 
specific and complex structure, rapidly changing at the beginning and gradually zoom-
ing in on the linguistic structure typical of mature speakers (mind you that we were 
speaking a rather particular Flemish dialect at home, and later he would rapidly switch 
between various other dialects with different phonetic and syntactic properties). As I 
said earlier, this structure could be described by means of the formal toolbox of gram-
matical rules, syntactic components and so forth. In a different context, I had learned 
about Piaget’s analyses of children’s developing thinking in terms of mathematical 
structures, such as groups or groupings, or operations. Irrespective of whether this 
analysis was correct, the message it conveyed to me was this: look, here is this whole 
range of spontaneous activities of children, of their answers to sometimes deliberately 
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weird questions of adults. But for the careful observer, these activities have organiza-
tional properties that can be described by means of the very abstract machinery of 
(then) modern mathematics and logic. You could say that the variety of real processes 
of language use or cognitive judgment in children converged onto formal structures as 
described in linguistics or mathematics. But the common interpretation of what Piag-
et was trying to do here was – and still is – unfortunately very different. It was and is 
based on what I might call the substantialization error (which in a substance ontology 
is not an error but simply the right thing to do). It means that for every property you 
can ascribe to an activity, there must be some identifiable entity (substance), in the 
form of a timeless structure, in the brain or the mind of the agent who can perform the 
activity to which that particular property can be ascribed (“timeless” means that the 
time dimension is not needed to describe the structure’s properties, except to indicate 
its duration of existence; a timeless property is also called “enduring,” which means 
that it is the same at every moment of its existence; to describe processes, on the other 
hand, the time dimension is necessary). Hence, if the variety of thought processes in 
children can be described in terms of properties of mathematical group theory, so the 
reasoning goes, there must be some sort of timeless structure in the brains of those 
children that is isomorphic to mathematical group theory, an internal representation 
of group theory. But how on earth is it possible that young children use a mathemati-
cal theory that is understood only by specialist mathematicians? But if the assigned 
internal structure is simple enough to be intuitively acceptable, substantialization pro-
vides the standard explanation of structured performance: an internal representation 
of grammar generates grammatical sentences, an internal representation of the object 
concept generates smart object retrieval activities and so forth. This substantialization 
error was rightly criticized by dynamic systems theorists such as Thelen and others 
(see the classical dynamic systems study on the A-not-B-error by Smith, Thelen, 
Titzer, & McLin, 1999). But it seems that, for fear that they might be accused of com-
mitting this error, for instance in the form of representationalism, dynamic systems 
theorists tended to deny – or maybe it is better to say tended to avoid emphasizing – 
that complex structure is indeed an emergent property of the embodied and embed-
ded activities performed by children, and adults for that matter (see also Witherington 
& Heying, 2015). But in terms of understanding how such structural properties emerge 
out of the total organismic organization of an embodied and embedded agent, we are 
currently only scratching at the surface. Such understanding is likely to advance only 
if we consider the dynamics of the organism-environment system and move away 
from our focus on the brain as a collection of mechanistic structures from which all 
these complex structural properties are directly emanating (for a general discussion 
see for instance Turvey & Carello, 2012, on “intelligence from first principles”).
Stages, Irreversibility and Directionality
D.B.: But how does all that relate to the issue of typical properties of development, 
particularly as conceived of in the classical theories, namely stages, irreversibility and 
directionality?
P.G.: These concepts refer to very natural properties of complex dynamic sys-
tems. Process properties such as self-organization and emergence lead to stability or 
metastability. Stability means that typical process properties are actively reproduced 
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over time, and that systems are spontaneously drawn towards states that can self-re-
produce (for a while at least). This relates to the emergence of attractor states, i.e. 
states that are self-sustaining. The concept of developmental stage is like an applica-
tion of this general concept of attractor. Complex systems can also self-organize into 
states of metastability, or into states of criticality. Metastability means that they tend 
to switch from one attractor to another. The switching of actual performance between 
various developmental levels over the short-term course of a problem-solving session 
(e.g., Granott, Fischer, & Parziale, 2002) is an example of metastability (Kelso & Eng-
strøm, 2006; Kelso, Dumas, & Tognoli, 2013). Criticality means that the system moves 
towards a state where any minor perturbation can cause an avalanche of changes 
from very minor to very substantial change over very short periods of time. Such ac-
celerations or discontinuities in the activity patterns of children may give rise to the 
belief that a new stage has emerged, although the change itself might be confined to 
a very specific developmental domain (see for instance van Dijk & van Geert, 2007, 
on discontinuities in language development).
As to irreversibility and directionality, I think we must refer to the fact that com-
plex systems are systems that are very far from thermodynamic equilibrium (this was 
the approach initiated by Prigogine, e.g. Prigogine, 1980, Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). 
They are systems with a high level of self-sustaining organization, such as human or-
ganisms, or termite colonies, or ecological systems. Self-sustaining organizations sur-
vive because they consume a lot of energy, they dissipate energy, in the jargon. It can 
be shown that, the more such dissipation takes place, the more the processes of orga-
nization – such as the emergence of stages or attractors – become irreversible. The 
reason is that the number of possible paths back to the initial state grows exponen-
tially as the organization into (temporarily) stable patterns consumes more energy, 
that is, consumes more information. The probability of getting onto the reversed path 
is astronomically low, which explains the basic irreversibility of the process. And di-
rectionality is what you get in self-organizing processes: they follow a path towards 
attractor states, or to metastability or criticality, as we discussed earlier, and this looks 
like an inherent sort of directionality or teleology. However, this final destination or 
telos is the emerging result of the underlying complex dynamics.
D.B.: To what extent is your dynamics orientation compatible with classic organi-
cist/systems approaches to development (e.g., Piaget, Werner, von Bertalanffy)?
P.G.: I see these approaches as entirely compatible with – or assimilable by – the 
modern view on the nature of complex dynamic systems. For instance, classic develop-
mental theories such as Piaget’s or Vygotsky’s, are inherently dynamic in their first prin-
ciples and have very important things to say about the “evolution rules” of developing 
dynamic systems. Recall that these evolution rules are the basic principles of change, and 
they provide the causal-process explanation for why a system actually moves through 
its state space. I think that these classical theories outperform many modern ones in 
terms of their focus on “first principles of development.” In earlier work, for instance I 
have tried to show that basic principles of change, such as Piaget’s assimilation-accom-
modation principle, or Vygotsky’s principle of the zone of proximal development, can 
be transformed into general developmental evolution (or change) rules. By combining 
these rules in a formal dynamic framework incorporating a generalized notion of dy-
namic fields, I have attempted to demonstrate that a wide variety of developmental phe-
nomena – gradual change, discontinuities and temporal stabilities for instance – for-
mally result from the underlying dynamics (van Geert, 1998, 2000).
Dynamic Systems Perspective 169Human Development 2019;63:153–179
DOI: 10.1159/000503825
Structure, Process and Recurrence
D.B.: But how does structure relate to dynamics and processes?
P.G.: Under the standard approach, the relationship between structure and pro-
cess is given by treating structure as an internal causal mechanism (see for instance 
the causal theory of latent variables, Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004; 
and Witherington & Heying, 2015, for a critical account). For instance, the structure 
representing a child’s knowledge of math concepts and operations is viewed as a sort 
of engine taking the math assignment as input and producing math-assignment-
making-behaviors and solutions to the math problems as output.
However, under a dynamic systems approach – which is basically processual – 
structure must be a property of processes, that is, of connected sequences of events, 
activities and so forth, taking place on a variety of timescales. I think we must look 
for the structure of a process in its recurrences, that is to say, in the temporal pattern-
ing of returning processual components (think for instance about the structure of a 
musical composition in terms of the pattern of recurrent or returning notes). 
But recurrence occurs under a particular structural description by an observer, 
for instance of what counts as notes in a tune, or of what counts as recurrent compo-
nents in speech, or in problem-solving activities (recurrence can be studied by means 
of recurrence quantification analysis, see for instance Guevara, Cox, van Dijk & van 
Geert, 2017, or by means of state space grids, e.g. van Dijk & van Geert, 2011). For 
instance, psycholinguists use a structural theory of language (grammar, syntax) to 
describe a particular vocal stream as a syntactic sequence of prepositions, nouns, 
verbs, etc. This allows them to follow the temporal recurrence pattern of syntactic 
structure over the course of verbal parent-child interactions (e.g., van Dijk & van 
Geert, 2011). These descriptive, instrumental devices – such as the theory of syn- 
tax – are themselves the products of historical, scientific development.
D.B.: But if recurrence applies to a particular sort of description of a temporal 
stream of activities of a person or of interacting persons, what is it then that causes this 
recurrence to occur? What produces the recurrence?
P.G.: Recall the basic definition of a dynamic system, which is that one state of 
the system produces another state according to the system-specific evolution rules. 
We have seen that dynamic systems are based on complex causal networks, the inter-
actions of which converge on a particular sort of dynamics, describable by these evo-
lution rules. I think that structures and structural descriptions – cognitive structures, 
grammar, concepts – can be used as particular approximations of evolution rules of 
complex “cognitive” beings such as humans. For instance, given a tool in the form of 
a structural (i.e., mathematical) description of fractions – the sort of thing schoolchil-
dren seem to like so much – you can generate a generic description or model of a se-
quence of activities, corresponding with solving such fractions and the sort of errors 
children can make. This process description is of course only a rough approximation 
of real processes of solving fractions that you can observe in real children, but it will 
nevertheless capture a lot of the typical recurrence patterns that you will find in real-
time series, over the short- as well as the long-term timescale. 
The question is of course how a particular evolution rule relates to an underlying 
network of causal coordinations or couplings between components on different layers 
of organization. Take for instance a simple evolution rule such as that describing pop-
ulation growth. It consists of a multiplication of the current population size by a frac-
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tion, adding a limiting factor corresponding to limited resources, eventually adding 
the effect of another population that preys on the first one, resulting in a so-called 
predator-prey or Lotka-Volterra equation. If we look at the corresponding material-
biological organization of predator-prey dynamics, we find a cascade of interacting 
levels of organization, for instance the biological organization of reproductive physiol-
ogy in individual animals, the biological organization of feeding and digestion, activi-
ties of finding food and sexual partners, of the physiology and physics of food resourc-
es, and so forth, almost ad infinitum. This complex material and biological organiza-
tion, with its myriad of interactions on a variety of levels, converges on a dynamics that 
can be represented by an extremely simple logistic or predator-prey equation, which 
nevertheless captures fundamental process-causal properties of the dynamics.
D.B.: Is there a privileged level of analysis (i.e., the cellular level, the organismic 
level, the level of action-in-context, the level of organism-world relations, etc.) for study-
ing the dynamics of psychological functioning and development? 
P.G.: The problem is that the notion of privileged level is open to several inter-
pretations. To begin with, there is the epistemological interpretation of the privileged 
level as the characteristic level of one’s scientific discipline. For psychologists, the 
privileged level comprises psychological phenomena such as human behavior, emo-
tions, consciousness, cognition (and many other things). It is their orientation point, 
a perspective, from which they can look at other levels, e.g. neurological, sociological 
or cultural. Looked at in this way, privileged levels are complementary. One level 
helps understand the other and vice versa. 
But the issue is a bit like a Russian Matryoshka doll: what is your privileged level 
within the level typical of (developmental) psychology? Is it the individual person or is 
it the person-environment system? Consider the notion of person that appears in either 
choice: is your privileged level that of the person as a collection of psychological attri-
butes (personality + intelligence + knowledge +…) or of the person as an adaptive agent? 
Is your privileged level the level of enduring entities or is it the level of processes? Is your 
privileged level the level of mind (concepts, knowledge, meaning, etc.) or is it the level 
of body (biology, neurology, the physics of perception-action couplings, etc.)? 
Looked at in this way, the issue of privileged level relates to the notion of explan-
atory foundations: which level provides the foundation for explaining another level 
or levels? We have various choices here. One is reductionism, claiming that one level 
can be explanatorily reduced to, and in the end replaced by, another. The classical 
example is the reduction of mental properties to underlying biological-neurological-
material properties: the reduction of things that a person does to things that the per-
son’s brain does (the latter is also known as the mereological fallacy, see Smit & Hack-
er, 2014). Another, which I prefer, is what I would call explanatory interactionism: 
explanations of phenomena at different levels interact to generate deeper understand-
ing at each level separately. For instance, processes that you can describe in terms of 
cognition, concepts and so forth can be better understood by realizing how they are 
grounded in sensorimotor processes, on the timescale of real action as well as on the 
timescale of development. Reciprocally, these sensorimotor processes must be under-
stood in terms of the cognitive and conceptual interpretations they enact. Explana-
tory interactionism is particularly pertinent in cases of emergent properties. What we 
call concepts or cognitions are emergent properties of particular physically and bio-
logically instantiated processes, invoking interactions between an agent, or interact-
ing agents, a world of material objects in the form of physical and symbolic tools, and 
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the agents’ history or histories laid down in an embodied form (e.g., connection pat-
terns in the brain and body). Understanding emergence in this case requires an inter-
action between understanding of upward causation (from the physical-biological to 
the mental, conceptual, etc.) and understanding of downward causation (from the 
emergent mental level to its physical-biological instan tiation).
The position of complex dynamic systems theory in all this is complicated, as 
usual. Developmental dynamic systems theory as initiated by Esther Thelen, for in-
stance, has rather close family ties with ecological psychology, which takes the physical 
organism-environment system as its unit of analysis. It is rather reluctant to accept the 
descriptive level of “mental” emergent properties, such as concepts or representations, 
as a necessary level of explanation in interaction with the level of physically-biologi-
cally instantiated properties, such as perception-action loops. My own position is 
much more of an interactional flavor, in that I think that concepts and representations 
and all that stuff must be understood as emergent properties of – and as fundamen-
tally grounded in – these basically physical interactions between organism and envi-
ronment, and reciprocally, that the latter sort of interaction patterns cannot be under-
stood but in function of the emergent properties that result from them.
Dynamics and Process Ontology
D.B.: Does a focus on the dynamics of development invoke a process ontology (in 
which time and variability are taken seriously) rather than a substance ontology (in 
which time and variability are explained away)? 
P.G.: An ontology is a general and pervasive set of beliefs on the fundamental 
nature of being. It is intuitive and enacted, rather than explicit and discursive. For 
instance, the praxis of scientific research in developmental psychology can be said to 
enact a particular ontology, even if the ontology itself is not a regular (or even ac-
cepted) topic of discourse. The standard praxis of developmental psychology enacts 
a substance rather than a process ontology (Overton and colleagues, who have exten-
sively written on this distinction speak about the Cartesian-split-mechanistic ontol-
ogy versus the process-relational ontology; e.g. Overton, 2015; Witherington, Over-
ton, Lickliter, Marshall & Narvaez, 2018). Let me try to clarify the difference by means 
of two explanatory concepts: photosynthesis versus object concept. With regard to 
photosynthesis, we would spontaneously opt for a process view, as we understand 
that photosynthesis is an ongoing process, a series of transformations taking place in 
plant cells. As photosynthesis is a process, time is an essential dimension of any form 
of conceptualizing or describing it. But with regard to the object concept, we are used 
to treating it as a substance, i.e. we enact a substance ontology1. That is, we are likely 
to see the object concept as a timeless internal structure, that is, an internal entity, a 
1 A truly gigantic philosophical literature exists on the meaning of substance. A good short introduction 
to the meaning of the substance concept is Robinson’s article on substance in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Robinson, 2018). Robinson has various other publications and books on the notion of substance 
and can be conceived of as a reliable source in this regard. Robinson also defended the view that there are 
mental substances, which grants the attribution of substance qualities to mental “things” such as intelligence, 
personality or self-esteem (see Robinson, 2016, pp. 233–247). Another good and comprehensive but short 
introduction to the notion of substance is an article by Barry Smith (2000; see also Smith, 1997). An important 
property of a substance is defined in Smith’s 1997 article as “substances are that which can exist on their own, 
where accidents require a support from substances in order to exist” (p. 108).
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thing on its own, that can be described without invoking the time dimension. Of 
course, the object concept is acquired at a particular moment in time, as it may also 
disappear at a particular moment in time, for instance as a consequence of some se-
vere neurological disturbance. But for its entire period of existence in an organism, 
the object concept is conceived of as being the same at any time, a static structure, a 
timeless entity. Or take a concept like intelligence. It lends itself almost automati-
cally to a substance-ontological interpretation, in terms of a timeless non-processual 
entity. Timeless entities may of course have properties that may change over time, for 
instance the property of magnitude or intensiveness, but those properties are second-
ary to the underlying entity.
But what if we interpreted the nature of object concept or intelligence in exactly 
the same way as we interpret the nature of photosynthesis, namely as processes, as 
sequences of transformations with a certain generic, that is to say recurrent property? 
Process ontology implies that the fundamental nature of being is inherently proces-
sual, that changes and transformations over time are an essential feature and that no-
tions of substances as timeless entities are constructed simplifications of temporary 
process stabilities.
Dynamic systems theory underscores a process ontology. It conceives of pro-
cesses as patterns of connected change over time, with properties that can be de-
scribed in the form of a state space, or a network. But these properties are inher-
ently processual, that is to say, time is a necessary component of their conceptual-
ization. Stability means that a process is reproducing its properties over time, 
causing them to remain the same, for all intents and purposes. The ubiquity of 
emergent and self-sustained stability on the level of human experience lures us 
into an ontology that is primarily substance-oriented, where the timeless thing is 
the fundamental building block of nature, and its eventual change is an inferred, 
secondary property. 
Hence, stability – of our bodies, our social institutions, our health, our knowl-
edge, our personality – is the result of a continuous amount of hard work, in addition 
to an awful lot of structure and organization in the processes in which stability occurs. 
The conceptual problem with process ontology is that it runs counter to our linguis-
tic habits to speak about timeless entities (nouns) to which change can be attached 
(usually by means of verbs). 
D.B.: From the vantage point of your dynamics orientation, what does it mean for 
the study of dynamics to involve a process rather than a substance ontology? What does 
it mean to take time and variability seriously?
P.G.: It means that we should make the study of processes the primary focus of 
developmental research. A process is a particular sequence of connected events over 
time, a sequence of states taking place on a variety of timescales, and they show 
characteristic temporal patterns such as fluctuations, variability, continuities and 
discontinuities. They are characterized by temporal intertwining with a context, 
which means that context is a fundamental process-causal component of those pro-
cesses, and not some added disturbing factor. Processes have a certain typical dura-
tion. Processes take place in real individuals, real dyads, real school classes and so 
forth. Studying processes means that you must explicitly look at all these phenom-
ena, and processes should be studied where, when and for the duration they actu-
ally occur, with the individual person (or any other individual case of interest) as 
the locus of study. If you study self-esteem in adolescents, for instance, you first 
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have to ask yourself what self-esteem means in process terms, i.e. by what sort of 
observable process is self-esteem instantiated. It’s likely to be a process of commu-
nicating, defending and displaying of expressions of self-value, for instance in the 
form of verbal statements with all their associated properties, such as expressed 
emotions (Delignières, Fortes, & Ninot, 2004; Wong, Vallacher, & Nowak, 2016; de 
Ruiter et al., 2015, 2017). It is the sort of process that is likely to unfold if an adoles-
cent is put in a position where he or she has to defend choices, concerns, interests 
and so forth, often against the opposition of a parent. The self-esteem process can 
be studied on the short-term timescale of seconds or shorter durations, capturing 
verbal as well as emotional aspects of an ongoing adolescent-parent discussion. 
Next, one could study whether such short-term fluctuations cluster into recurrent 
patterns over the course of the entire discussion, lasting 10 min for instance. By us-
ing techniques such as (cross-)recurrence quantification or fractal analysis, the re-
searcher can try to discover properties of the underlying dynamics, for instance in 
the form of the embedding state space (the number of dimensions one needs to 
describe the observed temporal pattern as an attractor, i.e. as a recurrent stable pat-
tern; de Ruiter, van der Steen, den Hartigh, & Van Geert, 2017). Finally, one could 
repeat such observations a few times over the course of weeks or months, to see 
whether the short-term pattern and its characteristic clusters change as a conse-
quence of the recurrent discussions. 
After having collected a number of such processes at all timescales over which 
they evolved in a variety of individual cases, the researcher can then try to classify the 
individual processes, in terms of similarities and differences, with the aim of finding 
out to what extent the processes are idiosyncratic or not. Highly idiosyncratic pro-
cesses are probably driven by a different type of dynamics than processes that are 
highly similar across individual cases. 
The ideal developmental processes study would follow individuals intensively 
over the course of their entire development. With the present current technological 
and statistical means of collecting and analyzing “big data” (many observations over 
time), following the entire developmental time span should not be a fundamental 
problem, although there are of course very serious problems with regard to privacy 
and the integrity of the person (see for instance https://blog.stephenwolfram.
com/2012/03/the-personal-analytics-of-my-life/). 
The standard research praxis, on the other hand, typically enacts a substance 
ontology. Self-esteem, for instance, is seen as a sort of timeless psychological en-
tity, with attached properties – such as intensity – that can vary over time. Vari-
ability is introduced as a contingent and accidental property, in the form of a dis-
tinction between trait and state self-esteem where the expression of the internal 
stable trait gets confounded by variable and accidental context influences. This 
internal entity (substance) can be accessed by means of dedicated measurement 
operations, using measurement tools such as tests. The entity self-esteem is exten-
sionally defined by all persons having self-esteem (including some other differen-
tial properties of interest such as age or gender). This implies that studying self-
esteem and its properties requires a sample of individuals that is statistically rep-
resentative of the total extensional set (the population of people having self-esteem). 
This way of stating the nature of psychological entities is associated with other 
requirements, generalizability in particular, that are highly specific and only mean-
ingful in the context of this particular substance ontology. Generalizability is al-
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most invariably equated with the question of whether a sample-based statistic, 
such as an average, comes sufficiently close to the corresponding (imaginary) pop-
ulation-based statistic. In truth, the standard generalization practices in terms of 
representative samples of “subjects” are very poor anyhow, as those samples are 
typically drawn from WEIRD populations (Western, educated, industrialized, 
rich, democratic; Rad, Martingano & Ginges, 2018; see also https://www.sapiens.
org/culture/weird-cultures-human-nature/). Unfortunately for process theory, 
the enactment of a substance ontology in psychological research is a very powerful, 
self-sustaining attractor state itself.
D.B.: Catchphrases like “embodiment” and “embeddedness” are also routinely as-
sociated with a focus on developmental dynamics. How are these terms conceptualized 
in your dynamics orientation? How are other terms, like “novelty,” “nonlinearity,” 
“complexity,” “system” and “emergence,” conceptualized in your dynamics orientation? 
P.G.: Embodiment and embeddedness are inextricably connected with being an 
organism. The first Dutch translation – in 1890 – of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, 
provides a now obsolete but highly illuminating Dutch word for organism, “bewerk-
tuigde wezens,” which, literally retranslated, means “beings equipped with tools to 
work with”2. Hence, embodiment primarily means that organisms are being equipped 
with tools to do things that are in the organism’s interest. One very specific tool is a 
human hand, with which humans can make artifacts that serve as material extensions 
of manual acts (basically almost anything that technology has produced). But these 
artifacts generate entirely new properties, for instance in terms of temporality and 
functionality. You can hold a certain amount of grain in your hand for a short while, 
but you can also make a pot to hold a much bigger amount of grain for a long period 
of time. Another very specific bodily human tool is the speech organ (lips, teeth, al-
veolar ridge, hard and soft palate, velum, uvula, vocal folds, glottis and various parts 
of the tongue). You could say that the physical speech organ allows you to produce 
sound patterns that are extensions of your thoughts and perceptions. But just as with 
material objects, structured sound patterns create entirely new possibilities for 
thought in the form of language (which your hands can transform into enduring ma-
terial symbolic objects in the form of writing for instance). That is, human beings 
embed themselves in environments that are infinitely complex extensions of the sen-
tient and acting human body, providing an ever-extending range of emergent prop-
erties in the form of opportunities that these extensions allow for. That is, develop-
ment implies the process of being embedded in and growing into an extended body 
and extended materialized mind with properties that infinitely increase those of the 
human body as a biophysical object. And this process takes place in the form of a 
continuous interaction with other human beings, occupying different places in this 
world of opportunities (e.g., with different levels of maturity, skill, expertise and so 
forth). This general framework is currently known as the 4E approach to psycholog-
ical phenomena as being embodied, embedded, extended and enacted (to which we 
should add the notion of interaction, I think).
Even the simplest possible dynamic process model implies an underlying complex 
process organization, with characteristic properties. These properties are emergence, 
2  The translator, Dr. H. Hartogh Heys van Zouteveen, translates “organisms” by bewerktuigde 
wezens: wezens = beings; be-(werk-tuig)-de: be-…-de = equipped with, issued with, werk- = work, -tuig = 
equipment, necessities. The term is no longer in use in Dutch and is unfortunately replaced by the seman-
tically opaque “organisme.”
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nonlinearity, self-organization, self-organized criticality, scaling (in)variance, timescales 
and so forth. Emergence is the general form of processes that create novelty, i.e. proper-
ties that result from self-organization, that are not reducible to properties of the under-
lying components, and that create downward causation, as explained earlier (e.g., when 
we discussed the question of what kinds of change constitute developmental change). 
Methodology and Analysis of Dynamics
D.B.: What does your dynamics orientation entail for developmental methodology 
and analysis, and, more generally, for orthodox scientific approaches to psychological 
functioning and development like the hypothetico-deductive method? What sorts of 
methods and analyses are and are not appropriate for the study of dynamics in develop-
ment? What are appropriate units of analysis for the study of dynamics in development?
P.G.: We have an enormous wealth of intuitive experiences with developmental 
processes, as we are direct witnesses to such processes ourselves. But we have surpris-
ingly little scientifically validated information about actual, individual developmental 
processes at the timescales that are relevant for understanding them. As to long-term 
patterns, what counts as longitudinal research, for instance, is usually little more than 
very shallow observations (e.g., test scores, aggregated questionnaire data), with long 
intervals in between, based on the simplest possible growth patterns (linear, asymp-
totic, etc.). Information about short-term processes in individuals, i.e. on how indi-
vidual subjects arrive at their answers in some experimental setup, is usually flushed 
through the drain of statistical aggregation in the form of average differences between 
groups or experimental conditions. So, given our impressive scientific ignorance with 
regard to actual developmental processes, we should put much more emphasis on 
exploratory research, in the form of so-called case studies, which are in fact studies 
on the level where actual processes take place. Process research is extremely labor in-
tensive, and for many process studies it is an illusion that the typical research resourc-
es will cover the costs and efforts of more than just a few cases. But as such detailed 
process studies become more frequent, we might start looking for similar patterns, 
typical differences and so forth. 
The theory on which all these process studies should be grounded is the very broad 
(meta-)theory of complex dynamic systems. That is, we should base our research on 
various, connected general assumptions: that development is a process of self-organiza-
tion and emergence; that the dynamics are caused by the way the components, proper-
ties or “variables” are interacting in the organism-environment system over time; that 
these interactions produce typically nonlinear patterns of change, and so forth, until 
proven otherwise. We should start from the assumption that the intra-individual varia-
tion that constitutes the essence of a process cannot be inferred from the inter-individ-
ual variation that forms the basis of almost all models in psychology (the so-called non-
ergodicity assumption, e.g. Molenaar & Campbell, 2009). This implies that the typical 
sample-of-individuals-based methods of the standard research praxis are not appropri-
ate for the study of developmental dynamics. The theory of complex dynamic systems 
provides a general ground for expectations and eventually hypotheses that can guide our 
research. But these expectations and hypotheses must be based on “first principles,” i.e. 
basic principles of organization in complex organismic systems. Finding out what the 
relevant first principles are for development is still a major challenge.
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To explore the current terra incognita of developmental processes, we must use 
all the tools we have. They can take the form of highly sophisticated statistical analy-
ses of time series, such as dynamic factor analysis or analysis of fractal dimensions 
(e.g., Molenaar, Lerner & Newell, 2013). Another technique is recurrence quantifica-
tion, using the temporal recurrence of process properties to discover general proper-
ties of the underlying dynamic system (e.g., Guevara et al., 2017). And there’s the 
widely used state space grid method (Hollenstein, 2013).
Our analytic tools can take the form of exploratory observational studies of ongo-
ing processes, eventually with interventions or perturbations that allow us to better un-
derstand the underlying dynamics. They can use various forms of exploratory machine 
learning techniques, cluster analysis and the like. They can take the form of qualitative 
descriptions of observed interactions, or they can be based on time-serial coding of ob-
served events and quantitative time-serial methods. Or they can take the form of dy-
namic systems or agent-based simulation models (e.g., Schöner & Spencer, 2016, on 
dynamic field models, or Steenbeek, van der Aalsvoort, & Van Geert, 2016, on agent-
based modeling of dyadic play). It goes without saying that even with the most tolerant 
methodological approach, researchers should be open about their methods, their obser-
vations or experiments, so that their studies are reproducible in terms of methods and 
approaches, and fully open to peer evaluation. The recent, lively debate on replicability 
of findings in the behavioral sciences is primarily focusing on reproducibility of results 
and advocates exact reproducibility of methods as a condition for obtaining the first 
(Zwaan, Etz, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2017). However, in a person- and process-oriented 
methodology, reproducibility of results is a very tricky issue, as many processes occur-
ring in complex dynamic systems will tend to be highly idiosyncratic and context-spe-
cific (for a discussion, see van Geert & de Ruiter, 2019). What counts is whether this 
idiosyncrasy is understandable in the context of an underlying theory of complexity, and 
whether the general approach of the study can be used by other researchers. 
As to the units of analysis, I take a similar agnostic (promiscuous, tolerant, what-
ever…) position as with regard to the methods to be applied. The units of analysis will 
depend on the timescale of interest (real-time activities vs. long-term changes). Any 
structural, formal description of recurrent patterns in the stream of human activities 
can serve as the basis for establishing units of analysis. This includes units of analysis 
based on cognitive, linguistic or other formal structures. But any unit of analysis one 
chooses is ultimately instantiated in an embodied and embedded processual condi-
tion, and this must be taken into account if one wishes to understand the dynamics 
of the units so described.
D.B.: Do you have a final concluding remark?
P.G.: I think that the field of developmental research itself is an example of a 
complex dynamic system, and the changes in the prevailing practices of research and 
theory building will follow one or some of the many types of trajectories complex dy-
namic systems theory describes. It is possible that we might see a – regrettable – sort 
of bifurcation in the field, leading to, on the one hand, a typical substance approach, 
coexisting with, on the other hand, a typical processual approach, with relatively little 
interaction between the two. But without a serious effort to study processes, we might 
remain stuck in the self-sustaining dynamics of a research praxis that imposes its in-
herent substance ontology as the only possibility. To paraphrase Captain James T. 
Kirk of the Starship Enterprise: “Process: the final frontier. … Our mission: to explore 
strange new worlds. … To boldly go where no man (m/f) has gone before!”
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